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FAULKNER V. NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC’S EFFECT 
ON AUTHOR'S RIGHTS IN ELECTRONIC TRANSFER 
 
Allison Hundstad* 
 
Cite as: Allison Hundstad, Faulkner v. National Geographic’s Effect on 
Author’s Rights in Electronic Transfer, 13 RIC. J.L. & TECH. 8 (2006), 
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v13i2/article8.pdf. 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Technological advances have triggered constant evolution in copyright 
law.1  As the Internet and computers have allowed images and written 
works to be available with the click of a button, Congress and the courts 
have been faced with the task of reshaping copyright law in order to 
determine the digital rights of material that already has copyright 
protection in its print form, with the goal of reducing the uncertainty 
surrounding the ownership of the right to reproduce these materials in a 
digital format. 
 
[2] Publication of literary works has been subject to copyright protection 
in the United States since the inception of the Constitution.  The 
Constitution grants Congress the power “to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”2  While the effect of copyright law is to secure rights for the 
author to profit from his or her work, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that the ultimate aim of copyright law is to provide an 
incentive to “stimulate artistic creativity” that will benefit the public 
good.3  Copyright laws reflect a balance between encouraging and 
                                                 
*University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law, J.D. candidate 2008.  The 
author would like to thank Brian Kirby, Mike Clements, and Professor James Gibson for 
their thoughts and suggestions during the editing of this article. 
1 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430-31 (1984). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
3 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
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rewarding the innovation of creative work on one hand and “promoting 
public availability of literature” and other artistic work on the other.4  In 
recent years, this balancing act has focused on how copyright ownership 
should be treated when transferring original print versions of photographs 
and articles into new electronic mediums. 
 
[3] In March 2005, the Second Circuit held, in Faulkner v. National 
Geographic Enterprises, Inc., that publication of a digital archive was a 
“privileged revision” of the publisher’s previously sanctioned print 
product.5  The court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in New 
York Times Co. v. Tasini6 that section 201(c) of the Copyright Act of 
19767 allows a revision of a collective work containing a freelance 
author’s work, provided that the work is placed in the same context as it 
was in the original.8  This note argues that the Second Circuit, in Faulkner, 
properly interpreted and applied the test set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Tasini. 
 
A.   SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
 
[4] This note will have three main focuses.  First, it will survey the 
historical jurisprudence surrounding copyright law as it pertains to 
collective works.  Second, this note will examine whether the Faulkner 
court used the correct standard for finding whether copyright infringement 
took place.  Finally, the note will conclude by focusing on the broader 
effect Faulkner may have on copyright law in the digital age. 
 
B.   A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF COPYRIGHT LAW GOVERNING COLLECTIVE 
WORKS 
 
1.   LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION OF “COLLECTIVE WORK” 
 
[5] According to the Copyright Act, a collective work is a “work, such as a 
periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of 
                                                 
4 Id. 
5 Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Enters., Inc., 409 F.3d 26, 38 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
126 S. Ct. 833 (2005). 
6 New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
7 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2004). 
8 Faulkner, 409 F.3d at 35 (citing Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488). 
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contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, 
are assembled into a collective whole.”9  Most magazines and newspapers 
qualify as collective works, because, unlike a typical book, they are the 
product of multiple authors and photographers.  The “copyright in each 
separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from the copyright in 
the collective work as a whole and [is vested] in the author of the 
contribution.”10  To constitute a separate contribution to a collective work, 
“each contribution to the collective work [must be able to] stand apart 
from the collective work and have some value.”11  Under Section 201(c) 
of the Copyright Act,12 unless the owner of the copyright in a contribution 
and the owner of the copyright in the collective work expressly agree 
otherwise, the latter is presumed to “only acquire the privilege of 
reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular 
collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later 
collective work in the same series.”13  The publisher of a collective work 
only has a copyright in the original creative elements (i.e., selection, 
arrangement, editing, etc.) that it adds to the underlying contributions.14 
 
[6] Section 201(c) was enacted to reduce the risk of individual authors 
inadvertently “surrendering all rights in a contribution to a collective 
work.”15  Congress passed Section 201(c) to expand the rights of authors; 
“when in doubt, courts should construe the rights of publishers narrowly in 
relation to those of authors.”16 
                                                 
9 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
10 Id. § 201(c). 
11 Blum v. Kline, No. 86-8149 (JFK), 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4424, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988) (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 201(c)). 
12 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). 
13 Id. 
14 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 122 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5738; 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04[B][2] (perm. 
ed., rev. vol. 2006). 
15 Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), reh’g denied, 
981 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d, 206 F.3d. 161 (2d Cir. 2000), aff’d, 533 U.S. 
483 (2001). 
16 Ryan v. CARL Corp., 23 F. Supp.2d 1146, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
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2.   JUDICIAL AUTHORITY FOR COPYRIGHT LAW GOVERNING COLLECTIVE 
WORKS 
 
[7] Recently, courts have attempted to determine whether an the author’s 
individual copyright for a contribution is infringed when the publisher 
revises a collective work or puts it in a new medium.  It is clear that 
copyright infringement takes place when individual articles from a 
collective work are photocopied because they are not reproduced “as part” 
of the collective work.17  Under Section 201(c), it is also undisputed that a 
publisher has the authority to “reprint a contribution from one issue in a 
later issue of its magazine . . . .”18  The public, including publishers, is also 
free to copy or otherwise use any contribution in a collective work that is 
in the public domain.19 
 
[8] While a publisher is not allowed to include a contribution in an entirely 
different magazine or other collective work,20 copyright infringement of 
an individual contribution becomes harder to identify when an entire 
collective work is transferred from its original format to a digital database 
or collection. 
 
A.   GREENBERG V. NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY 
  
[9] In 2001, before the Tasini decision,21 the Eleventh Circuit ruled in 
favor of a freelance photographer in Greenberg v. National Geographic 
                                                 
17 Id. at 1149. 
18 Id. at 1149-50 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 122). 
19 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2004); see also Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 
775, 782 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that, with regard to derivative work based on underlying 
work that is in the public domain, only the material added to the underlying work is 
protected by copyright law). 
20 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 122-23; see Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 
1267, 1273 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 122-23). 
Under the language of [§ 201(c)] a publishing company could reprint a 
contribution from one issue in a later issue of its magazine, and could 
reprint an article from a 1980 edition of an encyclopedia in a 1990 
revision of it; the publisher could not revise the contribution itself or 
include it in a new anthology or an entirely different magazine or other 
collective work. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 122-23.  
21 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 483.  
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Society22 on issues strikingly similar to those presented to the Second 
Circuit in Faulkner.  Plaintiff Jerry Greenberg was a freelance 
photographer who had taken pictures for the National Geographic Society 
(hereinafter “the Society”) four times over a period of thirty years.23  
While the terms of Greenberg’s original contract for the first three sets of 
photos gave all rights for the pictures to the Society, the Society 
reassigned the copyrights to Greenberg in 1985. The contract for the final 
set of photos returned the copyright to Greenberg sixty days after 
publication.24  Beginning in 1996, the Society entered into an agreement 
with Mindescape, Inc. to develop “The Complete National Geographic” 
(CNG).25  The CNG was a collection of every issue of National 
Geographic Magazine from 1888 to 1996 on CD-ROM.  The Society 
scanned every page of the magazine to create the digital format.26 
  
[10] Greenberg sued the Society for copyright infringement, alleging that 
the magazine could not use his copyrighted photographs in the CNG 
without his permission.27  The Society claimed that it had a privilege 
under Section 201(c) to create the CNG as a “revision” of the original 
version of the Magazine.28  The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the 
Society and held that certain elements of the CNG—namely the 
introduction to the CD-ROM and the database’s search capability—made 
the digital archive an “entirely different magazine or other collective 
work” and not a mere revision or reproduction.29  According to the court, 
the Society had “created a new product (‘an original work of authorship’) 
in a new medium, for a new market that far transcended any privilege of 
revision or other mere reproduction envisioned in Section 201(c).”30 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Greenberg, 244 F.3d. at 1267. 
23 Id. at 1269. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1270. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 1273-74. 
30 Id. at 1273. 
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B.   NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. TASINI 
  
[11] The Supreme Court took a dramatic step away from Greenberg31 a 
few months later in Tasini.32  A group of freelance authors sued the 
publications to which they had contributed (including the New York 
Times) for violating the Copyright Act by selling their articles to online 
databases such as LEXIS/NEXIS.33  LEXIS/NEXIS and other electronic 
databases entered into licensing agreements with the publishers of 
numerous magazines and newspapers to create a database from which a 
reader could search for and retrieve articles.34  The reader would see the 
text “in isolation, clear of the context of the original print publication 
presented.”35 
  
[12] The Tasini Court held that electronic databases that pull articles from 
multiple periodicals did not constitute a “revision” of a collective work 
within the meaning of Section 201(c) of the Copyright Act when the 
articles were retrievable as stand-alone text out of their original context.36  
The Court reasoned that, because the copyright in a collective work only 
covers the creative material that the publisher adds to the preexisting 
works,37 “[the Court could not] see how the Database perceptibly 
reproduces and distributes the article ‘as part of’ either the original edition 
or a ‘revision’ of that edition.”38  The Court mentioned that merely 
reproducing the works in a new medium, such as the database, would not 
de facto constitute infringement; microfilm and microfiche do not infringe 
on author’s rights because they keep the entire periodical intact when 
converting from one medium to another.39  Consequently, to avoid a 
copyright violation, a publisher must reproduce an author’s work in the 
same environment as it appeared in the original publication (i.e., 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
33Id. 
34 Id. at 489. 
35 Id.at 487. 
36 Id. at 488. 
37 Id. at 494 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 103(b)); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101) (holding that copyright in 
‘compilation’—a term that includes ‘collective works,’—is limited to the compiler's 
original ‘selection, coordination, and arrangement’). 
38 Id. at 500. 
39 Id. at 501-502. 
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surrounded by the same advertisements, articles, and photographs) unless 
it has the author’s express permission to reproduce the work differently.40 
  
[13] After Tasini, electronic databases were required to delete articles that 
were written by freelance authors for which they did not secure the rights 
from the individual author.41  If the article was not removed, the author 
could recover “statutory damages” and attorney’s fees. While each 
settlement would not be very large, the cumulative effect could be 
financially disastrous for electronic databases and publishers.42  Ironically, 
many freelancers who would want their work in an electronic database are 
also being removed.43  It seems that print publishers are barred from 
reproducing individual articles that have appeared in their publication or 
authorizing excerpts of the publication to be used elsewhere.44 
  
[14] A few years after the Supreme Court seemed to overrule Greenberg45 
with its holding in Tasini,46 the Second Circuit, in Faulkner v. National 
Geographic,47 decided whether it was possible to display a collective work 
in a digital archive or database without violating the Copyright Act.48 
 
II.   THE FACTS OF FAULKNER 
  
[15] Faulkner49 is based on facts similar to those presented in 
Greenberg.50  The plaintiffs were a group of freelance photographers and 
authors who contributed photographs and/or written works to be published 
in a number of issues of National Geographic Magazine.51  The assembly 
of photographers and authors sued the magazine for copyright 
                                                 
40 See e.g. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483. 
41 Alexander Lindey & Michael Landau, The Importance of Obtaining Rights for New 
Media, in 1 LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 1:33 (3d ed. 
2006). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001). 
46 New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
47 Faulkner v. National Geographic Enters., Inc., 409 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 2005). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Greenberg, 244 F.3d 1267. 
51 Faulkner, 409 F.3d at 29. 
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infringement for placing their works in “The Complete National 
Geographic” (CNG), a digital archive of previous issues of the magazine 
that allows users to search and view pages from the issues.52  The CNG 
was produced by digitally scanning each issue of the magazine two pages 
at a time so that the CNG user could see the magazine in exactly the same 
way he or she would if looking at the paper version.53  The digital version 
included all “text, photographs, graphics, advertisements,” etc. that 
surround the article or photograph.54  “The individual images and texts are 
therefore viewed in a context almost identical—but for the use of a 
computer screen and the power to move from one issue to another and find 
various items quickly—to that in which they were originally published.”55  
A search engine on the CD-ROM allows a user to find articles by 
searching for “certain words or phrases or a description of the article, such 
as title, author, date, or subject.”56  The digital archive also allows users to 
“focus on particular pages or portions of pages.”57  The Society registered 
the CNG with the Copyright Office stating that the “CNG is a 
‘compilation of a pre-existing material primarily pictorial’ and that 
additional material added to it is a ‘brief introductory audiovisual 
montage.’”58  The End User License Agreement allowed users to “modify 
and publish the Images as [they wished]” and “incorporate any Image(s) 
into your own original work and publish, display and distribute your work 
in any media.”59 
  
[16] The plaintiffs claimed that Section 201(c) of the Copyright Act60 
guaranteed each author or photographer the individual copyright to each of 
his or her contributions to the magazine, and that the CD-ROM archive 
was an unauthorized reproduction of those works.61  As discussed above, 
Section 201(c) provides that each separate contribution in a collective 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 30. 
54 Id. at 31. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 38. 
58 Id. at 32. 
59 Id. 
60 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §201(c) (2004). 
61 Faulkner, 409 F.3d at 34. 
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work is distinct from the copyright in the collective work as a whole and is 
vested in the author unless it is expressly transferred.62 
  
[17] The trial court found that the CNG was a “privileged revision under 
Section 201(c)” and the Second Circuit affirmed.63  The Second Circuit 
held that, “because the original context of the Magazines is omnipresent in 
the CNG and because it is a new version of the Magazine, the CNG is a 
privileged revision.”64  The following section discusses the appellate 
court’s rationale. 
 
III.   ANALYSIS 
 
A.   THE FAULKNER DECISION 
 
[18] The Second Circuit determined whether the district court was correct 
in applying the Tasini rule65 instead of the Greenberg holding.66  Because 
Greenberg was decided before Tasini, the Greenberg court did not 
consider the Tasini rule to determine whether the CNG was a privileged 
revision under Section 201(c).67  The Faulkner court followed Tasini 
because that intervening Supreme Court decision substantially departed 
from Greenberg so as to change the legal landscape.68  While Greenberg 
held that, “if a subsequent work contains independently copyrightable 
elements not present in the original collective work, it cannot be a revision 
privileged by Section 201(c),”69 the Tasini approach focuses on “whether 
the underlying works were presented by the particular database in the 
context of the original works.”70 
  
[19] Applying the standard set out in Tasini, the Second Circuit correctly 
found that copyright infringement did not take place.71  The court held 
                                                 
62 Id. at 34 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 201(c)). 
63 Id. at 30. 
64 Id. at 38. 
65 New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
66 Faulkner, 409 F.3d at 30. 
67 Id. at 36. 
68 Id. at 37. 
69 Faulkner, 409 F.3d at 37 (citing Greenberg, 244 F.3d 1267); 17 U.S.C. §201(c). 
70 Faulkner, 409 F.3d at 37 (citing Tasini, 533 U.S. 483). 
71 Id. at 30. 
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that, because the original context of the magazine was “omnipresent” in 
the CNG, it was a new version of the magazine and not, as found in 
Greenberg, a new collective work.72  Consequently, the court held that the 
CNG was a privileged revision under Section 201(c), and, since the 
publisher had the right to create a revision of the collective work, 
copyright infringement did not take place.73  A permissible revision can 
contain elements of the individual work at issue, such as the introduction 
and search capability of the CNG, that are not found in the original 
publication of the work.74  Since the CNG is a privileged revision, the 
freelance authors and photographers are not entitled to additional payment 
for their works’ inclusion in the CD-ROM archive. 
 
[20] The Faulkner decision seems contrary to Congress’s purpose in 
creating the Copyright Act of 1976.  As the court in Faulkner pointed out: 
 
Prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, authors risked losing all  
rights in their underlying works when they allowed such 
works to be used in a collective work.  To address this 
concern, the 1976 Act contained Section 201(c) and, in 
other provisions, "expressly permitted the transfer of less 
than the entire copyright . . . ."75 
 
As part of the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress enacted Section 201(d), 
which allows one’s copyright to be transferred “in whole or in part.”76  
Congress intended for the act to do “‘nothing to change the rights of the 
owner of copyright in a collective work’ but [to] merely clarify and 
improve an unfair legal situation by preserving an author's copyright in a 
contribution.”77  Instead of looking to Section 201(d)(1) to provide more 
rights to freelance contributors by allowing them to transfer part of their 
copyright while retaining the rights to the rest, the Faulkner court focused 
                                                 
72 Id. at 38. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. (citing Tasini v. New York Times Co., 206 F.3d 161, 167 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding 
that Section 201(c) “protects the use of an individual contribution in a collective work 
that is somewhat altered.”)). 
75 Id. at 39 (quoting Tasini, 206 F.3d at 168); see 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). 
76 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1)) (emphasis added). 
77 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 122 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.A.A.N. 
5659, 5738). 
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on Section 201(d)(2), which authorizes “owners of ‘[a]ny of the . . . rights 
. . . [sic] in a copyright’ to transfer such rights.  Therefore, publishers may 
transfer any subdivision of a copyright that they acquire.”78 
  
[21] After Tasini and Faulkner, an author will not be able to expect extra 
payment when his or her works are placed in digital archives that retain 
the context of the original work.79  However, he or she will be able to 
insist on payment when the publisher sells his or her work to a digital 
database (such as LEXIS/NEXIS) that does not retain the context of the 
original work.80  
 
B.   THE FUTURE EFFECTS OF FAULKNER 
  
[22] Two of the issues in determining the potential impact of Faulkner on 
copyright are (1) the possible effects on the ability of publishers to place 
contributions to a collective work on new electronic databases, and (2) 
whether the effects of Faulkner can be mitigated through contracts. 
 
1.   NEW THREATS IN THE DIGITAL AGE AFTER FAULKNER 
  
[23] In Greenberg, Tasini, and Faulkner, courts decided whether authors 
had to be compensated for placing their works that had previously been 
published as part of a collective work into digital or online databases.81  
The digital revolution, especially the Internet, has posed new threats to 
authors’ control of their copyrights. 
 
A.   GOOGLE PRINT: A NEW ONLINE DATABASE 
  
[24] Since the time of the Ancient Greeks, there has been an age-old desire 
to create a universal library containing every work ever written.82  
However, “the constant expansion of information has overwhelmed our 
                                                 
78 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2)); see Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 
804, 815-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding subdivisions of copyrights transferable), rev'd on 
other grounds, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2000). 
79 See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.   
80 See supra text accompanying notes 36-41. 
81 See supra Parts I, III.A. 
82 See Kevin Kelly, Scan This Book!, N.Y.TIMES, May 14, 2006, § 6. 
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capacity to contain it . . . [u]ntil now.”83  In December 2004, Google, 
operator of the widely used Internet search engine,84 announced that it 
would digitally scan books to make them searchable online.85  The 
Author’s Guild and five large publishers responded to the announcement 
by suing Google for copyright infringement.86 
  
[25] Google has reached contractual agreements with a number of public 
and university libraries to create digital “archives” of the libraries’ book 
collections through its “Google Print” program.87  Google Print is also 
working with publishers to allow searches involving their books.88  As part 
of the agreement, Google is permitted to duplicate and retain for its own 
commercial use a digital copy of the libraries’ archive.89  Google then 
plans to reproduce the works on its website to attract visitors and generate 
advertising revenue.90 
  
[26] On the Google Print website, Google claims that it has partnered with 
publishers and libraries to create “[a]n online book marketing program 
designed to help publishers and authors promote their books by showing 
you a limited number of sample pages.”91  The site allows the user to 
search book content in a similar fashion to Google.com’s search of 
webpages, returning snippets, sample pages, and/or full book views of 
books whose content matches the user’s search terms.92  Google Print will 
allow a viewer to read books from the public domain in their entirety and, 
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 Google Home Page, http://www.google.com/ (last visited May 28, 2006). 
85 See Kelly, supra note 82. 
86 Id. at 6. 
87 Class Action Complaint ¶ 2, Author's Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV8136, 2005 WL 
2463899 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005); see also Google Book Search, 
http://books.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=43740 (providing names of some 
libraries partnering with Google) (last visited May 28, 2006). 
88 See Jonathan Band, The Google Print Library Project: A Copyright Analysis, 
http://www.policybandwidth.com/ 
doc/googleprint.pdf (last visited May 28, 2006). 
89 Class Action Complaint ¶ 2, Author's Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV8136, 2005 WL 
2463899 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005). 
90 Id. ¶ 4. 
91 About Google Book Search, http://books.google.com/googleprint/about.html (last 
visited May 28, 2006). 
92 Google Book Search, supra note 87. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 2 
 
13 
for books that are still under copyright, Google will let publishers decide 
which portion of the book users will be able to view.93  Google states that 
the search is a free online book-marketing and sales program that will get 
authors’ books in the hands of interested readers so that they can purchase 
them.94  Google protects the books by not allowing users to copy, save, or 
print the content.95 
  
[27] The Author’s Guild, an organization of book authors that, among 
other things, works to protect literary copyrights, has filed suit to 
challenge the venture.96  The Guild claims that by reproducing and using a 
copy of books that are not in the public domain, Google is infringing upon 
the rights of the copyright holders.97  The plaintiffs argued that Google is 
violating Section 101 of the Copyright Act, which requires anyone 
wishing to reproduce digital copies of a work to obtain authorization from 
the holders of the copyrights.98 
  
[28] In its answer to the complaint, Google stated that (1) it has a fair use 
defense under Section 107 of the Copyright Act because it is only 
displaying a small portion of the books, and (2) it has received licenses to 
scan, copy, and/or display some or all of the various authors’ work.99  The 
fair use doctrine allows, among other things, reproduction for the purpose 
of “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching…scholarship or 
research.”100  The Guild argued that it is infringement because, while 
Google Print only shows small portions of a book, the search technology 
cannot function properly without a digital copy of the entire work.101  
                                                 
93 Kelly, supra note 82. 
94 Google Print Partner Program, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/publisher.html 
(last visited May 28, 2006). 
95 See id. 
96 Class Action Complaint ¶ 1, Author's Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV8136 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 20, 2005), 2005 WL 2463899. 
97 Class Action Complaint ¶ 3, Author's Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV8136 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 20, 2005), 2005 WL 2463899. 
98 Class Action Complaint ¶ 5, Author's Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV8136 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 20, 2005), 2005 WL 2463899 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)). 
99 Answer, Author's Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV8136, 2005 WL 3309666, ¶ 53 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Tim O’Reilly, Search and Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, 
at A27. 
100 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
101 O’Reilly, supra note 99. 
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[29] Google Print is not the only online program that allows a user to 
search the content of books.  In October 2003, Amazon, an online retailer, 
unveiled “Search Inside the Book.”102  Using this program, anyone can 
search and view the full text of over 120,000 books.103 
  
[30] While the possible decision in Author’s Guild v. Google and any 
litigation based on “Search Inside the Book” are outside the scope of this 
casenote, their possible effects on collective works are not.  While Google 
Print does not yet accept magazines,104 it is possible that it will in the 
future, creating a digital archive similar to the one at issue in Greenberg 
and Faulkner.  In accordance with Section 106 of the Copyright Act, 
Google Print claims that those authorizing the posting of the books must 
be the copyright holders and that they can rescind their consent at any 
time.105  In Tasini, the Supreme Court held that placing just the text of an 
article into an electronic database violated a freelance author’s copyright 
ownership rights.106  Following Faulkner, a publisher can authorize 
reproduction of the print version of its magazine into a digital format as 
long as the information remains in its original context.107  Therefore, a 
publisher may be able to authorize reproduction of articles from their 
magazine on Google Print without permission of the individual authors, 
provided that the articles remain in their original context in Google Print.   
 
[31] Google Print has the potential to have the same search capability as 
the Complete National Geographic, but with every magazine available and 
as a free service.  Such a program would further reduce authors’ ability to 
control their copyright if their publishers authorize Google Print to make 
whole articles available, which they would have to do in order to keep the 
                                                 
102 Jonathan Kerry-Tyerman, No Analog Analogue: Searchable Digital Archives and 
Amazon’s Unprecedented Search Inside the Book Program as Fair Use, 2006 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 1. 
103 Id. 
104 Google Book Search Help Center, 
http://books.google.com/support/partner/bin/answer.py?answer= 
18625&topic=322&hl=en_US (last visited May 28, 2006). 
105 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (stating that the owner of the copyright has the exclusive right 
to reproduce copies of or publicly display the copyrighted work); Google Book Search 
Help Center, supra note 87. 
106 New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 506 (2001). 
107 Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Enterps., 409 F.3d 26, 38 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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articles in full context, which is a requirement for Section 201(a) revisions 
under Tasini and Faulkner. 
 
B.   INTERNET SITES FOR NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES 
  
[32] With the increasing popularity of the Internet, newspapers, such as 
the New York Times,108 and magazines, such as TIME,109 have created 
websites that allow users to read the content of their publications.  While 
Tasini and Faulkner restrict publishers’ ability to sell their content to 
electronic databases, the next court battle between freelancers and 
publishers is likely to be over the Internet.110  The Internet version of a 
work does not meet the Tasini test if it fails to show the work in its 
original context.111  The Internet version of a newspaper or magazine may 
include articles, pictures, and/or advertisements that are not found in the 
original collective work, and sound and video can be added to the Internet 
version that were not part of the print version.112 
  
[33] Once the article is in a digital form, it “no longer possesses 
boundaries” and can be copied and distributed through, inter alia, e-mail 
and postings.113  While the Internet is intended to cultivate creativity by 
providing vast amounts of information, copyright holders need to be 
compensated when their works are viewed or used.114 
 
c.   CONTRACTS 
  
[34] Contract law plays an important role in determining whether the 
licensee or assignee of a copyright has the right to distribute an author’s 
                                                 
108 The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/ (last visited May 28, 2006). 
109 TIME, http://www.time.com/time/ (last visited May 28, 2006). 
110 Laurie A. Santelli, Notes and Comments, New Battles Between Freelance Authors and 
Publishers in the Aftermath of Tasini v. New York Times, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 253, 298 
(1998). 
111 Id.  “The publication of a periodical on the Internet or the Web does not constitute a 
‘recognizable . . . version of [the] preexisting collective work’ as required by the Tasini 
court to be a Section 201(c) revision privilege.” Id. (quoting Tasini v. New York Times 
Co., 972 F.Supp. 804, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
112 Id. at 299. 
113 Thomas K. Landry, Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts Roundtable on 
Electronic Rights, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 605, 624 (1996). 
114 See id. at 660. 
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work using a new technology.  In Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the 
Second Circuit held that a “licensee may properly pursue any uses which 
may reasonably be said to fall within the medium as described in the 
license.”115  Courts are not oblivious to the fact that "unlike real property 
and other forms of personal property, [a copyright] is by its very nature 
incapable of accurate monetary evaluation prior to its exploitation."116  
However, in Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney Co., the 
Second Circuit stated: 
 
We acknowledge that a result which deprives the author-
licensor of participation in the profits of new unforeseen 
channels of distribution is not an altogether happy solution. 
Nonetheless, we think it more fair and sensible than a result 
that would deprive a contracting party of the rights 
reasonably found in the terms of the contract it 
negotiates.117 
 
Therefore, while courts recognize the fact that an author stands to profit 
from new technologies, they also acknowledge that he or she can lose that 
right through contracts. 
  
[35] In Tasini, the Supreme Court addressed the fear that its ruling would 
create an injunction against the inclusion of freelance authors’ works in 
electronic databases and “punch gaping holes in the electronic record of 
history.”118  The Court’s solution was to allow authors and publishers to 
enter into contracts that allow the publisher to electronically reproduce the 
authors’ works because Section 201(c) governs only in the absence of an 
express agreement between the parties.119  An author can agree to assign 
or license the digital rights to his or her publisher, so that the publisher 
would have the right to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted work by 
                                                 
115 Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 125.3 (1964)). 
116 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.02 (2006). 
117 Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 487 (2d 
Cir. 1998). 
118 New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001). 
119 Id. 
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copying it to an electronic database.120  Authors can also use contracts to 
protect their copyrights.  One photographer’s contributions to The 
National Geographic were not included in the district court’s ruling, 
because there was “contractual language expressly denying [the] 
N[ational] G[eographic] S[ociety] any electronic rights.”121  Congress 
could also step in and modify the Copyright Act to vest ownership of the 
electronic rights of a work in an entity other than the work’s author in the 
absence of an express agreement.122 
 
[36] Publishers can avoid the Tasini ruling by using “all rights” contracts 
that include coverage for all possible new technologies.123  “All rights” 
contracts require a writer to surrender all of his or her copyrights for the 
work to the publisher.124  The New York Times, for example, requires all 
freelance contributors to give the newspaper all rights to his or her work 
by an express written agreement.125  Publishers can also use “time period” 
contracts to secure the exclusive right to copy a work for a given period of 
time, after which the copyright is returned to the author.126  During the 
time period covered by the contract, the publisher can reproduce the work 
online or sell the work to an electronic database without obtaining the 
author’s permission.127  For example, in Greenberg, the fourth contract 
that the freelance photographer negotiated with the National Geographic 
Society qualified as a time period contract because all rights in the work 
returned to Greenberg 60 days after publication.128  Finally, publishers can 
use “payment contracts” to compensate freelance contributors for past, 
present and future electronic uses.129  
                                                 
120 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); see also Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability 
Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 
1293 (1996) (providing conceptual guidance for intellectual property rights).   
121 Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Enterps., 409 F.3d 26, 41 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Faulkner 
v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 294 F. Supp. 2d 523, 531 n.30, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
122 See Frank H. Smith, Comment, Tasini v. New York Times Co.: A Copyright, or a Right 
to Copy?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1093, 1125 (1998). 
123 See Michael A. Forhan, Note, Tasini v. New York Times: The Write Stuff for Copyright 
Law?, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 863, 883-84 (1999). 
124 Santelli, supra note 110, at 278. 
125 Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 807 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
126 Santelli, supra note 110, at 280. 
127 Id. 
128 See Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001). 
129 Santelli, supra note 110, at 280. 
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[37] Assigning electronic rights through a contract can disadvantage 
writers by subjecting them to adhesion contracts that do not allow for 
negotiation with the publishers.130  Writers might go along with the terms 
that the publisher provides, because they fear it is the only way to be 
published and paid.131  Therefore, publishers can avoid the Tasini decision 
by using contracts to secure the right to republish an author’s work in a 
new medium up front. 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
  
[38] During a 2000 Senate hearing on the effect of the Internet on music 
copyright, Senator Orrin Hatch stated: 
 
[Copyright protection of works over the Internet] . . . must 
be secured in a manner which is mindful of the impact 
regulation can have on the free flow of ideas that a 
decentralized, open network like the Internet creates. We 
must protect the rights of the creator, but we cannot, in the 
name of copyright, unduly burden consumers and the 
promising technology that Internet presents to all of us.132 
 
Although this quote refers to the electronic dissemination of music, its 
application extends to providing print copyrighted works in digital format.  
While it is important to reward those who produce creative works by 
giving them protective copyrights, the true purpose of copyright is to 
promote public availability.  The holding in Tasini left the door open for a 
future court to find that a publisher could create an electronic database of a 
collective work containing work from freelance authors and 
photographers, provided that the works were placed in the same context as 
they were in the original print version. 
  
                                                 
130 Forhan, supra note 123. 
131 Id. at 884; see Santelli, supra note 110, at 279-80.  “Ultimately, freelancers must 
choose between signing the agreement and receiving a paycheck or asserting their rights 
and going hungry.  That these two choices sit at such extremes illustrates the freelancers’ 
lack of contract bargaining power with publishers.”  Id. 
132 Music on the Internet: Is There an Upside to Downloading?:  Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 2 (2000) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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[39] Since the Second Circuit decided Faulkner by correctly following the 
Supreme Court’s test for finding copyright infringement, the case provides 
a guide for future litigation based on electronic databases like Google 
Print and Search Inside the Book.  Publishers who wish to have the right 
to place their collective works into electronic databases have several 
options.  First, freelancers and publishers can negotiate contract terms that 
include turning over electronic rights to the publisher, so that publishers 
do not have to consider Faulkner or Tasini when authorizing the use of a 
collective work in a database.  Second, publishers can also compensate 
authors for putting their works in an electronic database. Finally, 
publishers can follow the Complete National Geographic example in 
Faulkner and copy entire pages into the database for context, thus 
escaping any liability under Tasini. 
  
[40] Although the holding in Faulkner does shrink authors’ rights to 
control their contributions to collective works, it also furthers the ultimate 
goal of copyrights – to provide information to the public in order to 
promote progress. 
 
